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In the last five years of his life Itamar Pitowsky developed the idea that the formal
structure of quantum theory should be thought of as a Bayesian probability theory
adapted to the empirical situation that Nature’s events just so happen to conform
to a non-Boolean algebra. QBism too takes a Bayesian stance on the probabilities of
quantum theory, but its probabilities are the personal degrees of belief a sufficiently-
schooled agent holds for the consequences of her actions on the external world.
Thus QBism has two levels of the personal where the Pitowskyan view has one.
The differences go further. Most important for the technical side of both views
is the quantum mechanical Born Rule, but in the Pitowskyan development it is a
theorem, not a postulate, arising in the way of Gleason from the primary empirical
assumption of a non-Boolean algebra. QBism on the other hand strives to develop
a way to think of the Born Rule in a pre-algebraic setting, so that it itself may be
taken as the primary empirical statement of the theory. In other words, the hope
in QBism is that, suitably understood, the Born Rule is quantum theory’s most
fundamental postulate, with the Hilbert space formalism (along with its perceived
connection to a non-Boolean event structure) arising only secondarily. This paper
will avail of Pitowsky’s program, along with its extensions in the work of Jeffrey Bub
and William Demopoulos, to better explicate QBism’s aims and goals.
I. DEDICATION BY CAF
This paper was written too late to appear in the memorial volume for Itamar Pitowsky
edited by Meir Hemmo and Orly Shenker [1], but it is never too late to tribute dear friends.
Itamar Pitowsky and Bill Demopoulos came into my life as a package. I met Itamar in
1997 at the Sixth UK Conference on Conceptual and Mathematical Foundations of Modern
Physics in Hull, England. It was my first quantum foundations conference, and to tell the
truth I was a little ashamed to be there: Indeed I had to work up the nerve to ask my
postdoctoral advisor John Preskill if I might use some of my funding for such a frilly thing.
And it was a frilly thing — only one talk in the whole meeting made any impression on me,
Itamar’s on simplifying Gleason’s theorem. It blew me away. When I got home, I studied
his paper [2] with meticulous care, not just for the math, but also for its programmatic
character. I found something so alluring in how he presented the big picture of his efforts at
the end, I pledged to one day write a paper myself ending with nearly the same words: “More
broadly, Theorem 6 is part of the attempt to understand the mathematical foundations of
quantum mechanics. In particular, it helps to make the distinction between its physical
content and mathematical artifact clear.”
Well, I must have made an impression on Itamar too, as he described me to Bill Demopou-
los as “a Wunderkind of quantum information”. (If we could only recapture our youths!)
One thing led to another, from more than 1,300 email exchanges, to many long, thoughtful
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2walks at Bill’s farm in Ontario. Both men made an indelible impression on me. Profes-
sionally, what set them apart from other philosophers of physics is that, rather than try to
dissuade me from developing QBism, they both were sources of constant encouragement.
But there was so much more than our professional relationships between us. At least in the
case of Bill’s passing, it was not so sudden as Itamar’s that I was able to tell him I love him.
This paper is dedicated to Itamar and Bill.
II. INTRODUCTION
QBism is a relative newcomer among interpretations of quantum mechanics. Though it
has identifiable precursors, no mature statement of it existed in the literature before 2009–
2010 [3, 4]. Indeed, even the pre-QBist writings of the developers themselves contain much
that QBism flatly contradicts [5]. One brief summary is that QBism is
an interpretation of quantum mechanics in which the ideas of agent and ex-
perience are fundamental. A “quantum measurement” is an act that an agent
performs on the external world. A “quantum state” is an agent’s encoding of her
own personal expectations for what she might experience as a consequence of
her actions. Moreover, each measurement outcome is a personal event, an expe-
rience specific to the agent who incites it. Subjective judgments thus comprise
much of the quantum machinery, but the formalism of the theory establishes
the standard to which agents should strive to hold their expectations, and that
standard for the relations among beliefs is as objective as any other physical
theory [6].
This is not the kind of move that one takes lightly. Only the stunning empirical success of
quantum mechanics, coupled with the decades of confusion over its conceptual foundations,
could have compelled the codification of thoughts like these into a detailed, systematized
research program. The practical triumphs of quantum physics imply that the questions of
conceptual foundations should be taken seriously, while the perennial debate, ceaseless and
without clarification, implies that a radical step is necessary.
When compared against most interpretations of the quantum, QBism requires perspective
shifts of an almost virtiginous character. For starters, it insists upon a stringently personalist
Bayesianism. The problem with physicists and probability is that when one has vast heaps
of data, pretty much any even half-baked interpretation of probability is good enough to
scrape by. It is not until we push further into matters of principle that mediocrity begins
to pose a real hazard. Fortunately, physicists are trained to shed intuitions that prove
counterproductive. We could once get by with acting like the data points which help shape
probability assignments actually determine them, but then, we also got along for quite a
while thinking that heavy bodies must fall faster than light ones.
Likewise, foregrounding the concept of agent means taking a first-person perspective,
and first-person singular at that [7]. This means rephrasing, and sometimes even rethink-
ing, some discussions of quantum matters. For example, a first-person take on quantum
communication protocols is that, fundamentally, Alice wants to be confident that Bob will
react in the way she needs after she has intervened in the world by sending a message. For
if Alice had no concern for the consequences returning to her or the potential suffering of
those she regards as kin, then she would abandon the photonics and just throw a bottle into
the sea.
3Some changes in language end up being rather modest, though, in scale if not in eventual
implication. QBism makes no category distinction between quantum states and probability
distributions; the former are just examples of the latter in a coordinate system adapted
for atomic and molecular physics [8]. Thus, the QBist avoids locutions like “the quantum
state of the system” in favor of “my quantum state for the system” — not too many
letters changed, but with a great deal of history behind the difference. A QBist exposition
might say, “Suppose a physicist Alice ascribes a quantum state ρ,” a turn of phrase that is
philosophically justified while also sounding quite natural, since ascribing quantum states is
a thing that working physicists actually do.
This example illustrates the peculiar flipside of QBist radicalism. After traversing the
wilds of personalist Bayesian probability and the further realms of participatory realism [9],
one arrives with a new appreciation of home. Certain habits of more innocent days turn out
to be philosophically justified, or at least justifiable; one learns that one can do quantum
foundations and quantum physics at the same time.
So, now that we’ve gotten a little bit of seeming almost-paradox on our fingers, it would
be good to sort out what is and is not a shocking departure. How does QBism situate itself
with respect to those other interpretational programs that share some of its morphology,
either by convergence or common ancestry?
III. TWO LEVELS OF PERSONALISM
Introducing a collection of correspondence, CAF identified three characteristics of QBism
that distinguish it from prior interpretations [10, p. ix].
First is its crucial reliance on the mathematical tools of quantum information
theory to reshape the look and feel of quantum theory’s formal structure. Second
is its stance that two levels of radical “personalism” are required to break the
interpretational conundrums plaguing the theory. Third is its recognition that
with the solution of the theory’s conundrums, quantum theory does not reach
an end, but is the start of a great journey.
We will return to the first point later (it is the motivation for the technical work that occupies
most of our time not given over to teaching and administration). In this section, we will
focus on the second point, the need for two levels of personalism. A pivotal moment in the
history of QBism was the realization that one level did not suffice, even though that was
already one more than many were willing to grant!
We have already met a significant part of the first layer in the introduction, where we
noted that in QBism, quantum states are the possessions of the agent who asserts them.
This is already enough to get booted from a philosophy-of-physics meeting, but we’ve hardly
gotten started. Chasing the demands of self-consistency, we find that other elements of the
quantum formalism must also be given the same status as quantum states, that is, the status
of personalist Bayesian probability assignments. One important example is the association
of specific POVM elements with potential future experiences. A positive-operator-valued
measure, or POVM for short, is the basic notion of measurement in quantum information
theory. Briefly put, a POVM is a collection of positive semidefinite operators on a Hilbert
space that sum to the identity operator on that space, and each of the operators (or “ef-
fects”) in the set corresponds to a possible outcome of the measurement that the POVM
represents [11, 12].
4In contrast, in the tradition of Bub, Demopoulos, and Pitowsky one moves from quantum
to classical by replacing the space of possible events with a non-Boolean algebra. Quantum
probability is Bayesian probability on this algebraic structure. Events are tied to projectors
on Hilbert space, and this binding is in essence an objective fact of nature [13]. This leads
quickly to trouble [14]. For suppose that a physicist Alice starts her day with a subjective
probability assignment, encoded as a density operator ρ. She then performs a measurement
and obtains an outcome, which will be associated with some projector Π. She updates
her state assignment accordingly, replacing ρ with Π. But now, her probabilities have been
locked to an objective value. In order for the personalism of quantum-state assignments not
to collapse into triviality, there has to be more flexibility. (For additional discussion on this
point, see the 10 January 2007 entry drawn from correspondence with Bub, Demopoulos,
Pitowsky, and Veiko Palge in Appendix B.)
The thorn that spurred the development of the second level of personalism was the
old thought-experiment known as “Wigner’s Friend” or the puzzle of the observer being
observed [8]. This is a tale — not as old as time, though within the insular world of
quantum foundations, it may seem so — a tale of two agents and one quantum system.
The agents could be Wigner and his friend, or in the lingo of quantum information, Alice
and Bob. The story begins with Alice and Bob having a conversation. They both agree,
let us say, that a quantum state |ψ〉 expresses their beliefs about the system. (If they are
inclined to the Bayesian school, they don’t have to agree at this stage. |ψ〉 is a catalogue
of expectations, or bluntly put, a compendium of beliefs. But let’s say they do agree so
far.) Moreover, they agree that at a given time, Alice will perform an experiment upon the
system, a measurement which both Alice and Bob say is represented by some mathematical
structure such that if Alice observes outcome i, she will update her expectations to the state
vector |i〉. Then, Bob walks away and leaves the room. Alice is alone with the system. Time
passes, and the agreed-upon moment of measurement goes by.
What, now, is the “correct” state that each physicist should have chosen for the system?
Alice, everyone concurs, should have selected some vector |i〉. But what about Bob? Unless
he holds Alice somehow exempt from quantum mechanics, he would express his beliefs about
her, in principle, with a quantum state ρ, and a time-evolution operator family Ut with which
he can adjust those expectations and calculate probabilities pertaining to different times.
Before Bob interacts with Alice or the other system, he would write a joint state for the
two, a quantity of the form
Ut (ρ⊗ |ψ〉〈ψ|)U †t (1)
which will in general be an entangled state. Bob’s state for the system will be a partial trace
of this, typically a mixed state completely different from |i〉.
Either Alice or Bob could be deemed “incorrect”; for if either “had all the information”
they would arguably be forced to adopt the state assignment of the other.
And so the back and forth goes. Who has the right state of information? The
conundrums simply get too heavy if one tries to hold to an agent-independent
notion of correctness for otherwise personalistic quantum states. A QBist dis-
pels these and similar difficulties by being conscientiously forthright. Whose
information? “Mine!” Information about what? “The consequences (for me) of
my actions upon the physical system!” It’s all “I-I-me-me mine,” as the Beatles
sang [8].
Lately, there has been a resurgence of interest in Wigner’s Friend — a growth industry, by
the standards of quantum foundations. These recent elaborations of Wigner’s Friend wrap
5it around a no-hidden-variables argument [15–18]. QBism, having answered the original
conundrum on its own terms, finds nothing troubling about these elaborations. (Pusey
regards an extended Wigner’s Friend puzzle as “actually good news” for QBism and for
Rovelli’s Relational QuantumMechanics [17]. For a comparison and contrast between QBism
and Rovellian RQM, see [6]; for a critical evaluation of various statements made about QBism
in this niche of the literature, see [19].)
IV. GLEASON’S THEOREM
Gleason’s theorem is, in our experience, less well-known among physicists than some of its
conceptual descendants and confrères. The original statement had the mildly intimidating
language of finding “all measures on the closed subspaces of a Hilbert space” [20]. In more
detail, Gleason defined a frame function of weight W for a separable Hilbert space H to be
a function f : H → R such that if {xi} is an orthonormal basis of H then∑
f(xi) = W. (2)
A frame function is regular if there exists a self-adjoint operator T acting on H such that
f(x) is given by an inner product
f(x) = (Tx, x) (3)
for all x ∈ H. Gleason proves, by ingenious and somewhat arduous means, that all nonneg-
ative frame functions in three or more dimensions are regular.
If the weight of a frame function is 1, then that function begins to look like a proba-
bility assignment. In physics language, Gleason showed that if measurement outcomes are
represented by vectors in orthonormal bases, then any consistent ascription of probabilities
to measurement outcomes must take the form of the Born Rule. The definition of frame
functions assumes that probability ascriptions are noncontextual [21]: The function f sends
a vector to a number in the unit interval, regardless of what basis that vector may be a part
of. Rather remarkably, Gleason’s proof yields both the set of valid density operators and
the Born Rule. Quite an economy of postulates! It is easy to see why an attempt to rebuild
quantum theory on a better axiomatic footing might proceed by way of Gleason’s theorem.
As Wilce put it [22],
The point to bear in mind is that, once the quantum-logical skeleton [the lattice
of closed subspaces of H] is in place, the remaining statistical and dynamical ap-
paratus of quantum mechanics is essentially fixed. In this sense, then, quantum
mechanics — or, at any rate, its mathematical framework — reduces to quantum
logic and its attendant probability theory.
Why, then, have the QBist and QBist-adjacent efforts at reconstructing quantum the-
ory skipped past Gleason’s theorem? Part of the answer lies in that invocation of “the
quantum-logical skeleton”: As any good biologist knows, bones are not simple affairs [23],
and presuming a working skeleton is asking for quite the sophisticated development already!
Gleason begins with a Hilbert space and orthonormal bases upon it. How, then, should
we arrive at Hilbert space? Pitowsky presents an argument for getting to the point where
Gleason can take over, a representation theorem for lattices that satisfy a certain set of con-
ditions inspired by quantum mechanics [24]. He admits a gap in this argument, partly closed
6by another remarkable theorem, this one by Maria Pia Solèr [25, 26]. But the QBist concern
is more fundamental: Those lattice-theoretic conditions hail from the quantum physics of
the 1930s, when “uncertainty” was the shocking feature, long before the discovery of more
subtle mysteries like the violation of Bell inequalities. We can always take a fundamentally
classical theory, a theory of local degrees of freedom, and hide those variables by imposing an
“uncertainty principle” [27, 28]. The resulting theories include features like the no-cloning
theorem, incompatible observables, and even interference between paths in a Mach–Zehnder
interferometer. This modern perspective, informed by studies into questions like what a
quantum computer requires to outperform a classical emulation of one, takes the glamor
away from the notions in which quantum logic was grounded.
The original version of Gleason’s theorem fails if the Hilbert space is two-dimensional.
Why? When d = 2, one cannot hold one basis vector in place and twirl the others around
to generate multiple distinct bases. So, the constraints assumed by Gleason are too weak
to carry real implicative weight. One might, for example, paint the northern hemisphere
of the Bloch sphere all over with 1’s, and the southern hemisphere with 0’s. The resulting
assignment of probabilities to von Neumann measurements — remember, orthonormal bases
in d = 2 are pairs of antipodal points on the Bloch sphere — would be consistent with
Gleason’s rules, yet no choice of density operator ρ can yield those probabilities. This pesky
difficulty is obviated if one follows the practice of quantum information theory and broadens
the notion of measurement beyond the von Neumann definition to the wider class of POVMs.
Doing so allows a proof of a Gleason-type result that is both simpler to prove and applicable
in d = 2 where Gleason’s was not [29, 30]. For additional discussion, see [31–33].
The general good cheer created by shifting the fundamental notion of measurement to
POVMs led QBism further from the quantum-logic tradition.
V. NON-BOOLEANITY AS A CONSEQUENCE
In this section, we will derive non-Booleanity as a consequence of a more fundamental
manifestation of quantum strangeness, the nonexistence of intrinsic hidden variables. We
will step through this argument for the case where it is simplest, a single qubit, which is
already enough to derive a theory with noncommuting observables. Having gotten that
far, we will briefly outline two approaches to generalizing the argument and thus deriving
quantum theory in higher dimensions.
The centerpiece of the QBist program for reconstructing quantum theory is the concept of
a reference measurement. This is an experiment with the property that if an agent possesses
a probability distribution over its outcomes, she can calculate the probabilities that she
should use for any other measurement. In classical particle mechanics, a reference measure-
ment would be an experiment that reads off the position and momentum of all particles in
the system, thereby locating it within phase space and allowing the agent to extrapolate the
full dynamical trajectory. Any other experiment — say, observing the total angular momen-
tum — is essentially a coarse-graining of the information that the reference measurement
provides. If Alice expresses her uncertainty about the system’s phase-space coordinates as
a probability distribution over phase space, then she can calculate her probabilities for the
possible results of a coarse-grained observation by convolving that “Liouville density” with
an appropriate kernel.
Classical mechanics has the property that if two Liouville densities are distinguishable
by a coarse-grained measurement, then they are nonoverlapping. Quantum physics violates
7this principle, in a way that we can make precise.
Consider the following scenario [34]. An agent Alice has a physical system of interest that
she plans to perform either one of two experimental protocols upon. In one protocol, she will
send the system directly into a measuring device and obtain an outcome. In the other, she
will pass the system through a reference measurement first and then send it into the device
from the first protocol. Let Hi denote the possible outcomes of the reference measurement
and Dj the possible outcomes of the other. Then Alice can write her expectations for the
results of these two protocols as P (Hi, Dj), for sending the system into the Dj device via the
reference Hi experiment first, and Q(Dj), for going directly into the Dj device. Probability
theory itself imposes no bond between these expectations: different conditions, different
probabilities! But the additional assumption that the reference measurement simply reads
off the pre-existing physical condition of the system, an ontological assumption on top of
probability theory, does furnish a link:
Q(Dj) =
∑
i
P (Hi, Dj) =
∑
i
P (Hi)P (Dj|Hi). (4)
The first equality here is a physical assumption, while the second is mandated by logic.
That is, if Alice rejects the second equality — the “Law of Total Probability” — she is being
Dutch-book incoherent, whereas if she rejects the first, she is just being skeptical about the
applicability of classical intuition. Quantum physics provides a replacement for the first
equality. Instead of marginalizing over Hi as in the previous expression, one performs a
“quantum marginalization”:
Q(Dj) = µ (P (Hi, Dj)) . (5)
The exact form of the function µ will depend upon the choice of POVM used as the reference
measurement.
To make this more concrete, let us take the case where the system of interest is a single
qubit. Then a reference measurement can be any POVM whose effects span the space of
Hermitian operators on the Hilbert space C2. For example, let the reference measurement be
a POVM whose effects are proportional to rank-1 projectors that form a regular tetrahedron
inscribed in the Bloch sphere. A convenient indexing is to let a and b take the values ±1,
and to write
Hab =
1
4
(
I + 1√
3
(aσx + bσy + abσz)
)
. (6)
These four operators sum to the identity and span the space as desired. With
P (Hab) = tr(ρHab) (7)
by the Born Rule, we have
Q(Dj) = tr(ρDj) =
∑
ab
[
3P (Hab)− 12
]
P (Dj|Hab). (8)
Here, we have defined
P (Dj|Hab) = 2tr(DjHab) (9)
as Alice’s probability of obtaining the outcome Dj given that her preparation for the system
is the state proportional to Hab.
8In this case, the function µ takes the form of the classical Law of Total Probability but
with an elementwise affine map applied to the probability vector P (Hab). Said another way,
Eq. (8) is the Born Rule, written in explicitly probabilistic language throughout.
We see that picking a reference measurement establishes a mapping from density matri-
ces into a probability simplex, thereby furnishing a wholly probabilistic way to write the
quantum theory of a qubit. Importantly, in this representation not all probability vectors
correspond to valid quantum states. The state space P is the ball in R4 within which
1
6 ≤
∑
a,b
P (Hab)P ′(Hab) ≤ 13 , ∀ P, P
′ ∈ P . (10)
The pure states will be exactly those that saturate the upper bound on their Euclidean
norm. Orthogonal states are maximally distant, saturating the lower bound, but the lower
bound is not zero. As we prove in Appendix A, this is in fact a very general result, holding
true for any reference measurement: Quantum states that are orthogonal in Hilbert space
are overlapping probability distributions.
We can turn this idea around. Let’s forget quantum theory for the moment and take the
relation
Q(Dj) =
N∑
i=1
[αP (Hi)− β]P (Dj|Hi) (11)
as the defining axiom of a probabilistic theory. That is, let’s say that this expression, which
“breaks” classical intuition in the minimal way possible, is the empirical rule on top of
probability theory that tells us how to “marginalize” over an experiment that is not merely
ignored, but unperformed. Probability vectors P (H) and conditional probability matrices
P (D|H) are consistent with one another if they always yield valid probability vectors Q(D)
when combined in this way. This provides a reciprocal consistency condition between the
set of valid P (H) and the set of valid P (D|H), which we can turn into a condition on the set
of valid P (H) by making some fairly mild assumptions relating those two sets. For instance,
we can posit that the state of maximal indifference, the flat probability vector, is a valid
P (H), and that posteriors from maximal indifference are valid priors. (For some conceptual
background, see the 7 January 2011 entry drawn from correspondence with Demopoulos in
Appendix B.) This implies that, if the P (H) are column vectors, then any row in a matrix
P (D|H) is the transpose of some valid P (H), up to overall scaling:
P (Dj|Hi) = γP ′(Hi). (12)
The condition that Q(Dj) be always nonnegative then yields
α
∑
i
P (Hi)P ′(Hi)− β
∑
i
P ′(Hi) ≥ 0, (13)
which by normalization simplifies to
P · P ′ ≥ β
α
. (14)
Pairs that saturate this bound are maximally distant from one another and imply a Q(Dj)
of 0. Moreover, because Q(D), P (H) and P (D|H) must themselves be properly normalized,
we have that
1 = α−Nβ. (15)
9We follow the guiding principle that our theory should be as broadly applicable as pos-
sible, so the structures within it should have no “distinguishing marks or scars” that would
make them peculiar to particular physical situations. Likewise, we want the sets we derive
to be maximal with respect to the constraints we apply: To do otherwise would be to im-
plicitly admit an additional constraint, and thus to be making more empirical assumptions
on top of the basic “nonclassical marginalization” rule originally posited. Therefore, our set
P ⊂ RN of valid probability vectors must have the property that any two points in it have
a Euclidean inner product greater than β/α, and including any additional point would spoil
that property.
This is already enough to make available some useful tools from higher-dimensional ge-
ometry. Given a point P in the probability simplex ∆, the polar of P is the set of all vectors
in RN whose elements sum to unity and which have an inner product with P that is greater
than or equal to β/α. The polar of a set is the set of all vectors that are in the polars of all
the points in the given set:
A∗ =
{
u :
∑
i
u(i) = 1, u · v ≥ β
α
∀v ∈ A
}
. (16)
The requirement that a state space P be maximal implies that it is a self-polar subset of
the probability simplex [34].
To move in the direction of quantum theory, we introduce a concept of dimension in
terms of Mutually Maximally Distant sets. For any self-polar subset of the probability
simplex, there must be a smallest sphere that encloses it, i.e., the circumscribing sphere of
the state space. The states on this sphere are states of maximal confidence with respect to
the reference measurement. We define a Mutually Maximally Distant set in P to be a set of
points on the intersection of P and its circumscribing sphere such that any two points in the
set saturate the lower bound on the inner product, β/α. This is the tool we need to establish
an information-theoretic notion of “dimension”: The dimension of a system is the largest
possible size of a set of hypotheses, each of which are assertions of maximal confidence, and
any two of which are maximally distinct from each other. (This is the natural counterpart
of classical probability theory, where hypotheses of maximal confidence are Kronecker delta
functions.) A brief derivation [34, 35] shows that
d = 1 + r
2
out
r2mid
, (17)
where rout is the radius of the circumscribing sphere and
rmid =
1√
Nα
(18)
is the radius of the mid-sphere, the sphere around the barycenter within which any two
points always have an inner product that satisfies the lower bound.
The fundamental “bit” in our theory is a system whose state space Pbit meets the following
condition. The maximal size of a set of points, any two of which are maximally distant from
each other, is equal to exactly 2. In other words, given any hypothesis of maximal confidence
about the system, there exists exactly one other hypothesis of maximal confidence fully
distinct from it. (And if this applied only to some of those extremal hypotheses, then the
state space would have “distinguishing marks and scars” indicating some other empirical
10
constraint that we are not allowing at this level of generality.) For our state space Pbit
to have this geometrical property and to satisfy the maximality condition given above, it
must be a ball within the probability simplex in RN . Moreover, we can say which ball it is,
because unless we invoke further empirical additions to probability theory, we have to use
the distance scale that is already available to us, meaning that Pbit is the inscribed ball of
the probability simplex. That is, to satisfy the condition d = 2, we must have rout = rmid,
and both of them are in turn fixed to the value
rout = rmid = rin =
1√
N(N − 1)
. (19)
We still have to fix the Euclidean dimension N for the fundamental “bit” system. There
are multiple ways of doing so [34], each of which suggest different “foil theories” to quantum
mechanics. However, even before fixing N , we know already that as long as the “nonclassical
marginalization” rule (11) is indeed nonclassical (that is, β > 0), our theory will spurn
explanation in terms of intrinsic hidden variables. With N = 4, we recover the Bloch ball
and the theory of a single qubit, including all the POVMs that can be performed upon it.
This is already enough to prove the impossibility of underlying hidden variables: While a
qubit theory restricted to von Neumann measurements can be explained classically, fully
general POVMs upon a qubit cannot [36].
In order to reach this conceptual point as quickly as possible, we have stepped only lightly
upon the algebraic manipulations. For more detailed treatments, see [3] and [34], as well
as [37, 38].
Having derived the theory of a single qubit, one way forward would be to compose
them. An argument based on Einstein locality, and using the postulate of a reference
measurement to justify a Gleason-type noncontextuality condition, gives the tensor-product
rule for composing state spaces [14, 39]. This still leaves open the question of why the joint
states for, say, a bipartite system of two qubits should be the positive semidefinite operators
on the tensor-product space. A voyage into the literature yields at least one answer to this
question [40, 41], but the assumptions involved may feel unsatisfying — mathematically
over-powered or physically under-motivated.
Another option, and the one we prefer, is to start with Eq. (11) and take it as the basic way
to express the nonexistence of intrinsic hidden variables for systems of all dimensionalities d.
In the same manner as before, this yields a theory defined by a qplex, a proper subset of the
probability simplex in Rd2 . Any two points P and P ′ in a qplex P satisfy the inequalities
1
d(d+ 1) ≤ P · P
′ ≤ 2
d(d+ 1) . (20)
For details on how to go from the very general-looking Eq. (11) to these particular inequal-
ities, see [34]. The remaining challenge is then to identify the qplexes that are isomorphic
to quantum state space — the Hilbert qplexes — among all the possibilities, and to do so
in the most economical possible way. Current research focuses on relaxing the conditions
that are known to work, and understanding the geometrical structures that are necessary to
establish the isomorphism, which turn out to be quite captivating entities [42–48].
Assuming that the Law of Total Probability is the way to “marginalize” over an unper-
formed experiment, and the desire for distinguishable states to be nonoverlapping distri-
butions, are expressions of faith in hidden variables. QBism holds that the way to make
progress is to let go of this faith and encourage something more interesting in its place. This
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analysis echoes Demopoulos’ criticism of the early Putnam, in which Demopoulos points out
how a worldview can reduce to being a hidden-variable one even if it was not formulated
with a specific ontology — Bohmian or de Broglian, say — explicitly in mind [49]:
By claiming to avoid hidden variables, Putnam almost certainly meant that he
could avoid a theory like Bohm’s or de Broglie’s. For Putnam, such theories are
characterized by their invocation of special forces to account for the disturbance
by measurement. Since he nowhere appeals to such forces, Putnam believes
his account to be free of an appeal to hidden variables. The idea that his
interpretation of the logical connectives assumes an underlying space of truth-
value assignments — and that it is therefore a hidden variable interpretation of
quantum mechanics after all — appeals to an abstract notion of hidden variable
theory, one which was only beginning to emerge when Putnam wrote his paper,
and one with which he was at the time almost certainly unfamiliar.
VI. INTERLUDE: THE PBR THEOREM
In the previous section, we explored the consequences of abandoning the notion that
distinguishable means nonoverlapping. This provides a convenient setting to discuss the
Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph (PBR) theorem [50]. The PBR theorem is a “no hidden variables”
argument, or to say it more precisely, an argument that hidden variables will end up being
redundant. Following the tradition of what nowadays is called the “ontological models
framework” [51], it tries to express quantum probabilities as being due to ignorance of
underlying ontic states, and then shows that different quantum states must correspond to
nonoverlapping distributions over the ontic state space. The crucial feature of the ontological
models framework is that probabilities for experiment outcomes are calculated using the Law
of Total Probability:
trρE =
∫
dλPρ(λ)P (E|λ). (21)
By adopting the Born Rule in the “quantum marginalization” form of Eq. (11) as a fun-
damental postulate, we spurn this framework from first principles onward. And because
QBism lies outside of the ontological models framework, preferring to find its realism on a
more subtle and stimulating level, the PBR theorem has little to say about it. Indeed, the
PBR theorem has no direct impact on QBism at all, though it may have the indirect effect
of indicating that half-hearted attempts at interpreting quantum theory in an informational
way do not go far enough.
The PBR theorem relies upon a compatibility criterion between quantum states that was
first codified by Caves, CAF and Schack [52], based on an earlier proposal by Peierls [53,
p. 11]. Bub has an admirably concise exposition of the PBR theorem, in an essay where he
also raises the intriguing question of proving analogues of it in nonclassical theories that are
not quantum mechanics. He shows that an analogue of the PBR theorem can be proved in
a nonclassical and nonquantum setting that he calls “Bananaworld” [54].
VII. DEMOPOULOS
The interpretational work of Demopoulos owes much to Pitowsky. He credits Pitowsky
for advancing and defending “the view that the ψ–function represents a state of belief about
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a system rather than its physical state” [55]. Demopoulos regards the probabilities in quan-
tum physics as being probabilities over “effects”, which are explicitly not the effects that
comprise POVMs [49]. Rather, they “are to be thought of as the traces of particle inter-
actions on systems for which we have ‘admissible’ theoretical descriptions in terms of their
dynamical properties” [55]. It is ultimately difficult to draw a line between this and, for
instance, Pauli’s imagery of data recorded “by objective registering apparatus, the results of
which are objectively available for anyone’s inspection” [56]. Therefore, we find Demopoulos’
interpretation vulnerable to critiques in the Wigner’s Friend tradition.
That said, there is much in Demopoulos’ writing that aligns with QBism, and in the
interests of solidarity and emotional positivity, we will spend much of this section talking
about that.
First, let us get out of the way one of the more significant divisions between QBism and
the position that Demopoulos articulated. From the standpoint of the former, the latter
tends to slide back to a rather Bohrian view that quantum phenomena must be treated
through classical intermediary apparatus, with a definition of classical that may have more
to do with stable record-keeping than with the details of Newtonian or Maxwellian dynamics.
Quoting a letter that CAF wrote to Demopoulos on 9 January 2011 [10]:
I didn’t see that you strengthened your defense against my charge of a kind of
dualism. Maybe I’m still missing something. When you write, “Such systems
are epistemically accessible to an extent that systems which are characterized
only in terms of their eternal properties and their effects are not,” I would think
that you’re admitting that there are (at least) two distinct kinds of systems in
the world: Those that have a certain type of epistemic accessibility and those
that do not, and that that epistemic accessibility is not characterized by things
to do with the observer’s situation, but rather the with system’s itself. [. . .] And
you don’t weaken my accusation any either by writing on page 18: “This kind of
conceptual dependence, does not preclude the application of quantum mechanics
to systems that record effects. Although it is largely a matter of convenience
which systems are, and which are not, taken to record effects, it is not wholly a
matter of convenience.” The phrase ‘not wholly a matter of convenience’ again
points me to an ontic distinction between two types of system. Again, a reason
for my saying, “dualism”. Similarly with respect to your sentence, “This leaves
entirely open the empirical question of why it is that some systems appear to
be amenable to descriptions that are expressible in the framework of classical
mechanics.” I.e., you don’t explain why, but there is an empirical distinction
between two kinds of system.
I’m not saying there’s anything necessarily philosophically wrong with a du-
alism; mostly it is that it just doesn’t match my taste, and doesn’t feel like
the right direction for moving physics forward. It adds a bigger burden on the
physicist than I’d rather him have: For now, for each lump of matter, he’ll have
to — in some mysterious way — come to a conclusion of whether it supports
dynamical properties or not. How does he do that? Where you leave us is where
Bohr left us — as far as I can tell, in just telling us “it must be so, but I’m not
going to tell you where/how to make that distinction” . . . i.e., that there must
be two kinds of system for us to build our evidentiary base for the quantumly
treatable ones at all.
Imagine my going up to Rainer Blatt and saying, “Rainer, I just found this
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nice rock on the beach. You think you might be able to use it as a component in
that quantum computer you want to build?” Asher Peres would say, “Of course
he can use it as a component; it is just a matter of money. With enough money,
any old rock can be polished into a quantum computer.” But if it ain’t so, then
it must be a burden on physics to say when it can and when it cannot be done.
My guess is that Rainer will never be able to codify and make explicit such a
criterion of distinction; he’ll never be able to tell me which tests he must perform
to certify my rock ineligible for quantum computation.
When discussing Gleason’s work, Demopoulos considers two-valued measures, maps from
the closed subspaces of a Hilbert space to the pair {0, 1}. He notes [55],
It is evident that generalized two-valued measures and generalized truth-value
assignments are formally interchangeable with one another, whatever the con-
ceptual differences between probability measures and truth-value assignments.
QBism stresses the “conceptual differences”: Its preferred school of Bayesianism forcefully
rejects the idea that a probability-1 assignment indicates pre-existing physical truth. This
leads to dismissing the EPR criterion of reality.1 As CAF wrote to Demopoulos on 29
November 2007 [10], regarding the paper eventually published as [49]:
Where I do take issue with what you write is the very difficult issue of probability
1. If I understand you correctly, I disagree with the first sentence of the first
full paragraph from page 22: “The representation of an elementary particle as
a function which, when presented with an experimental configuration, yields an
effect, is interchangeable with its representation as a class of propositions only
when the effects are predictable with 0-1 probability.”
For, I would say, not even then.
Additional discussion on this point can be found in the 24 June 2006 entry drawn from
correspondence with Bub in Appendix B.
Having established this difference in content and in taste, we can now proceed to matters
of greater agreement. Demopoulos writes [49],
Instead of providing a solution to the long-standing issues involving measure-
ment and the paradoxes, the discovery of “the logic of quantum mechanics”
revealed a new and different problem, namely, the impossibility of interpreting
the probabilities of the theory so that every proposition belonging to a particle
is non-contextually determinately true or false. Rather than refuting classical
logic, this discovery should be seen as refuting the idea that the probabilities
are interpretable as the probabilities of such propositions. Ironically, the conse-
quences of quantum mechanics for logic are almost the precise opposite of what
1 Likewise, it implies that “incompatible” quantum-state assignments do not have to indicate different
intrinsic physical conditions of a system. Two quantum states ρ and ρ′ are incompatible in the Peierlsian
sense if there exists a measurement for which ascribing ρ implies the outcome probabilities (0, 1), whereas
ascribing ρ′ implies the outcome probabilities (1, 0). Shifting one’s state assignment from ρ to ρ′ thus
changes a probability-0 assignment into probability-1, but the agent has no obligation to regard this as a
shift of a pre-existing physical property, for the same reason that they do not take EPR as gospel.
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Quine and Putnam imagined they might be. If anything, the problem of hid-
den variables upholds the centrality of classical logic in our theorizing about the
physical world, while allowing that the Boolean algebraic structures, which are
so closely associated with classical logic, are not appropriate for every use of
probability in physics.
QBism finds much to like here. Rather than stressing the “classical logic” language, QBism
speaks in terms of internal self-consistency: Within a given scenario fixed by an agent’s
choice of action, the agent’s mesh of beliefs should hold together, i.e., they should be Dutch-
book coherent. Moreover, the notion of Dutch-book coherence is, after a fashion, built upon
“classical logic”. That is, one way of expressing the basic precept of it is that an agent
should not assign different probabilities to events whose descriptions can be translated to
one another by Boolean manipulations. The Law of Total Probability itself follows from
Dutch-book coherence, but it is “not appropriate for every use of probability in physics”.
QBism has been accused of being “instrumentalism” with tiresome regularity. In this
regard, it is helpful to recall Demopoulos’ response to that charge being leveled at his own
interpretation. Replying to the accusation that his view would make quantum physics “a
mere heuristic for prediction”, Demopoulos noted [49],
What is at issue is the interpretation of the quantum algorithm for assigning
probabilities and for reasoning from the position of uncertainty which such prob-
abilities necessarily signify. This leaves a considerable degree of realism intact.
First, there is nothing in the view that denies the existence of elementary parti-
cles [. . .]. Secondly, the view allows that there is a plethora of properties which
elementary particles are unproblematically represented as having; these include
all of their eternal or non-dynamical properties. Both they and the particles
themselves are real objects of theoretical investigation.
QBism reserves the right to quarrel with the letter of this creed, but it is in accord with the
spirit of it.2 The technical work outlined in §V above is a fundamentally realist investigation
of exactly the type that Demopoulos indicates.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have availed ourselves of Pitowsky’s program and its extensions, par-
ticularly the work of William Demopoulos, to better explicate QBism’s aims and goals.
The Pitowskyan interpretation of quantum mechanics is, chiefly, the idea that the formal
structure of quantum theory should be seen as a Bayesian probability theory, adapted to
the empirical situation that Nature’s events conspire to conform to a non-Boolean algebra.
QBism also gives a Bayesian reading of quantum probabilities, but it instead regards them
as the personal degrees of belief a savvy agent might hold for personal experiences arising
from her actions on the external world. Thus QBism has two levels of personalism, whereas
the Pitowskyan view has only one.
2 For example, a working field theorist might devalue the word particle, or at least drop many connotations of
it. But her motivation to do so would be based on the Unruh effect or on spacetime curvature invalidating
a choice of positive-frequency subspace [57]. These reasons would have little to do with the “interpretation
of quantum mechanics” as that topic has socially been defined. For more on QBism and QFT, see [6].
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As we have seen, the differences go further and get into the technical meat of quantum
information. The Born Rule is crucially important for the technical developments of both
views, but in the Pitowskyan tradition it is a theorem, derived per Gleason from the under-
lying assumption of a non-Boolean algebra. In contrast, QBism strives to place the Born
Rule in a pre-algebraic setting, so that it itself may shine forth as the primary empirical
statement of the theory. The QBist approach to reconstructing quantum theory hopes that,
in the right language, the Born Rule is quantum theory’s most fundamental postulate, with
the Hilbert space formalism arising as a consequence. There remains a certain à la carte as-
pect to the reconstruction of quantum theory from the Born Rule; the aspiring reconstructor
has at some junctures her choice of secondary postulates to invoke, though they mostly have
the character of asking that the resulting structures be as mathematically unremarkable as
possible so that all the physics can be loaded into the Born Rule. We have stepped through
this in the special case of a single qubit and the POVMs thereupon.
The distinctions between QBism and the Bub–Demopoulos–Pitowsky school manfiest
in shifts of technical emphasis. We have seen, for example, how the QBist reconstruction
program plays down Gleason’s theorem and the quantum-logic tradition. On a deeper and
more conceptual level, the two diverge in their theories of truth. There is, at least implicitly,
a sentiment for a correspondence theory of truth in how Bub, Pitowsky and Demopoulos
approach the quantum. By contrast, QBism invokes a Jamesian, pragmatist attitude. This
is a move that is unfamiliar to many in the present-day philosophy-of-physics circles, as
evidenced by Timpson’s needing to define it for the professionals who read Stud. Hist. Phil.
Mod. Phys. [58] with a footnote:
Pragmatism is the position traditionally associated with the nineteenth and early
twentieth century American philosophers P[ei]rce, James and Dewey; its defining
characteristic being the rejection of correspondence notions of truth in which
truths are supposed to mirror an independently existing reality after which we
happen to seek, in favour of the thought that truth may not be separated from the
process of enquiry itself. The caricature slogan for the pragmatist’s replacement
notion (definition) of truth is that ‘Truth is what works!’ in the business of the
sincere and open investigation of nature.
(The authors admit a fondness for James, not just on account of his ideas but also because
he writes to be understood — indeed, to make the life of the mind a thing that is felt.)
This turn to pragmatism has concrete expression in the QBist rejection of the EPR cri-
terion and sidelining of the ontological models framework. To a QBist, trying to recast
all quantum probabilities as ordinary, neoclassical ignorance is to miss the point entirely.
One way or another, such efforts end as baroque restatements of their starting point. Much
more intriguing are nontrivial reproductions of portions of quantum theory within such a
framework, since these illustrate how some “quantum” behaviors are only weakly nonclassi-
cal. Among these are the no-cloning theorem and the fact that there is generally no good
Boolean “and” operation for experiments — for spin-xˆ and spin-zˆ measurements upon a
bit system, to pick an easy example. In turn, this demonstration indicates that quantum
logic put its emphasis in the wrong place. This is no slight to its pioneers, only a retrospec-
tive judgment based on discoveries after their time. (As scientists, we belong to the last
profession of romantics [59], the last to believe in geniuses — and John von Neumann was
certainly one of those.)
Like we are with many subjects, we are quite willing to raid the quantum-logic bookshelf
to find inspiration for technical conjectures [60], but non-Booleanity is not where we are
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seeking the fundamental lesson of quantum mechanics. For us it is a consequence, not a
presumption. More broadly, writing the Born Rule as Eq. (11) is part of the attempt to
understand the mathematical foundations of quantum mechanics. In particular, it helps to
make the distinction between its physical content and mathematical artifact clear.
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Appendix A: Even Orthogonal Quantum States are Overlapping Probability
Distributions
We begin by generalizing Eq. (6) to an arbitrary four-outcome reference measurement
{Hi} for a qubit. This is the minimum number of outcomes necessary for a qubit reference
measurement; any fewer, and the POVM elements could not span the state space [61]. Given
any qubit state ρ, at most one element of the set {Hi} can be orthogonal to it, and so at
most one entry in the vector P (H) can equal zero. Consequently, any two qubit states ρ
and ρ′ will have probabilistic representations with overlapping support.
To generalize further and encompass systems of arbitrary dimension, as well as reference
measurements that are not necessarily minimal, first we show that we can focus our atten-
tion on pure states. We can write any density matrix as a convex combination of rank-1
projectors, say in the matrix’s eigenbasis, so if we have two quantum states
ρ :=
∑
i
ci|ψi〉〈ψi|, ρ′ :=
∑
j
c′j
∣∣∣ψ′j〉〈ψ′j∣∣∣, (A1)
then their Hilbert–Schmidt inner product is just a weighted average:
trρρ′ =
∑
ij
cic
′
j
∣∣∣〈ψi∣∣∣ψ′j〉∣∣∣2 . (A2)
Let us say that the probabilistic representations of these basis vectors are
si(k) := trHk|ψi〉〈ψi|, s′j(k) := trHk
∣∣∣ψ′j〉〈ψ′j∣∣∣. (A3)
Then, the inner product of ρ and ρ′ is a weighted average of the “B-inner products” of these
probability vectors:
trρρ′ =
∑
ij
cic
′
j s
T
i Bs
′
j, (A4)
where the matrix B is the inverse of the Gramian of the reference measurement:
[B−1]mn = trHmHn. (A5)
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The B-inner product of two valid probability vectors is bounded below by zero. What does
this imply for the ordinary Euclidean inner product, i.e., the dot product? In particular,
can the dot product ever be zero itself? To understand this, it suffices to consider two pure
states, since per the above discussion, mixing cannot lower their inner products. Suppose
that |ψ〉 and |ψ′〉 are two different pure states in dimension d. They define a subspace of
the full space of Hermitian operators on Cd. Let HPk denote the images of the reference-
measurement effects projected into this subspace. Any quantum state living within this
subspace will have the same inner products with the HPk as it did with the original Hk.
Thus,
s(k) := 〈ψ|Hk|ψ〉 = 〈ψ|HPk |ψ〉, (A6)
and likewise for s′, the probabilistic representation of |ψ′〉.
Imagine that s · s′ were zero. Because each entry in either vector is nonnegative, this can
only happen when s and s′ have completely disjoint supports. In other words, some of the
HPk will be orthogonal to |ψ〉〈ψ|, and some will be orthogonal to |ψ′〉〈ψ′|. And for each value
of k, at least one of these options will obtain.
In the qubit-sized subspace defined by |ψ〉 and |ψ′〉, there is a unique state orthogonal
to |ψ〉 and a unique state orthogonal to |ψ′〉. Call these |ψ⊥〉 and |ψ′⊥〉; they are antipodal
to |ψ〉 and |ψ′〉 respectively on the Bloch sphere for this subspace. Each of the HPk must be
proportional either to |ψ⊥〉 or to |ψ′⊥〉. But this means that the HPk cannot span the subset of
state space given by |ψ〉 and |ψ′〉 — the reference measurement cannot be “informationally
complete” on this subspace, for any such measurement must have at least four distinct
outcomes to cover a qubit. Consequently, the proposal that s · s′ = 0 contradicts the
assumption that we had a working reference measurement in the first place. And so, for
any reference measurement Hk whatsoever, the dot product of valid probability vectors will
always be greater than zero, even when the corresponding quantum states are orthogonal.
Appendix B: Additional Excerpts of Correspondence
Itamar Pitowsky to CAF, 5 May 2001:
Of course, you can print [our correspondence]. The whole thing is a wonderful
idea. Historians of science often complain that published articles never tell even
half the story of science, because they don’t let you see the false starts, misleading
intuitions, errors, or even how a sound idea is baked. Correspondence makes the
story come alive, but it usually takes almost a century to publish, and it’s done
only in cases of the likes of Einstein. . . . Your collection arrives on the scene
almost in real time, very nice.
CAF to Itamar Pitowsky, 26 June 2002:
I too used to think that the [partial Boolean algebra] approach was the way
to go if one wanted to build up a theory along quantum logical lines. But
now, I’m not so convinced of it. That is because I am starting to think that
quantum mechanics is more analogous to the epistemological theory Richard
Jeffrey calls “radical probabilism” than anything else. From that view, there are
“probabilities all the way down” with one never getting hold of the truth values
of any propositions. Rüdiger Schack and I just discovered a wealth of material
on Jeffrey’s webpage http://www.princeton.edu/∼bayesway/.
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In any case, I think what this leads to is that we ought to be focusing much
more on characterizing quantum mechanics solely in terms of the “logic” of
POVMs than anything else — these being the structures analogous to what crops
up in Jeffrey’s “probability kinematics.” Thus, if one is looking to characterize
PBAs, the best task might be to focus on the kinds of PBAs that POVMs
generate, rather than the ones of Kochen and Specker based solely on standard
measurements. [. . .] Beyond that, I am now of the mind that all one really ever
needs for understanding quantum mechanics is a single Boolean algebra that is
kept safely in the background (solely) for reference. The rest of the theory (and
indeed all real-world measurement) is about probability kinematics with respect
to that algebra.
CAF to Bill Demopoulos, 21 April 2004:
As you argued in your earlier letter to me (one from last year sometime), our
views — or maybe just our languages — may not be so incompatible as one
might think. However, I am left with the feeling that this is only a contingent
feature of the particular stages of the game we happen to be at, at the moment.
In particular, from my own view, I think it is quite important that we strive
to stop thinking of quantum states as states of knowledge about the truth value
of this or that proposition (even if truth value is not invariant with respect to
‘experimental arrangement’ — the idea you are toying with). My feeling is that
the imagery of measurement outcomes mapping to truth values (in this context
anyway) will only cloud our vision for how to take the next big step.
What is the next big step? I think it is a deeper understanding of how
— very literally — the world “is in the making” (to use a Jamesian phrase).
To try to make that idea at least graspable (if not either clear or consistent
yet), and to try to show you quantum theory’s role in all this, let me attach
four letters I’ve written recently. They’re contained within the attached files.3 I
think they are my best statements to date of what I am shooting for; and I think
that goal fundamentally conflicts with the idea of “measurement” propositions
having truth values in the conventional sense.
That is not to say, however, that I am yet ready to give up on the idea of
physical systems having autonomous properties. The question is, what can still
be pinned down as a property in the conventional sense?
CAF to Bill Demopoulos, 17 February 2006:
Let me try to consider a situation and 1) try to imagine what you would say
of it (but probably in my idiosyncratic language), followed by 2) what I think I
would say of it . . . and then see if there is a substantial distinction.
Start with a finite dimensional Hilbert space, say of dimension 3, and imagine
it indicative of some real physical system within an observer’s concern. From
that Hilbert space, let us form all possible sets of three mutually orthogonal
3 In the large samizdat [10], see the 24 June 2002 note “The World is Under Construction” to Wiseman;
the 27 June 2002 note “Probabilism All the Way Up” to Wiseman; the 12 August 2003 note “Me, Me,
Me” to Mermin and Schack; and the 18 August 2003 note “The Big IF” to Sudbery and Barnum.
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one-dimensional projection operators. That is, let us consider all possible sets
of the form {P1, P2, P3}.
What is it that you would say of those sets? If I understand you correctly,
it is this. Each such set {P1, P2, P3} corresponds to a set of mutually exclusive
properties that the system can possess. At any given time, one of those projectors
will have a truth value 1 and the other two will have values 0. Now consider
a potentially different such set {Q1, Q2, Q3}; again, at any given time, one of
those projectors will have a truth value 1 and the other two will values 0. What
is interesting in your conception, if I understand it, is that even if two elements
happen to be identified between those two sets — for instance, if P1 = Q3 —
there is no requirement that P1 and Q3 need have the same truth value; P1 might
have the truth value 0, whereas Q3 might have the truth value 1. Another way
to say this is that the truth-value assignments depend upon the whole set and
not simply the individual projection operators. For you, all the identification
P1 = Q3 amounts to is that the probability for the truth value of P1 within the
set {P1, P2, P3} is the same as the probability for the truth value of Q3 within
the set {Q1, Q2, Q3}. (If you were a Bayesian about probabilities — though I
don’t think you are — you would say, “Well P1 has whatever truth value it does,
and Q3 has whatever truth value it does (each within their appropriate set of
mutually exclusive triples), but my degree of belief about the truth value of P1
is the same as my degree of belief about the truth value of Q3. That is the
rule I am going to live by.”) Then it follows from Gleason’s theorem that there
exist no probability assignments for the complete (i.e., continuously infinite) set
of triples that are not of the quantum mechanical form. In particular, one can
never sharpen one’s knowledge to a delta function assignment for each triple.
This is how you cash out the idea of an ‘incompletely knowable domain.’
That is a novel idea, and if I understand it correctly, I like it.
However, now let me contrast my characterization of you with what I think
has been my working conception. I prefer not to think of the triples {P1, P2, P3}
as sets of mutually exclusive properties inherent within the system all by itself,
but rather actions that can be taken upon the system by an external agent. Each
set of such projectors corresponds to a distinct action; what the individual ele-
ments within each set represent are the (generally unpredictable) consequences
of that action. What are the consequences in operational terms? Distinct sensa-
tions within the agent. The reason I insist on calling them consequences, rather
than “sensations” full stop, is because I want to make it clear that the domain
of what we are talking about is sensations that come about through the action
of an agent upon the external world.
The essential idea of [what was to become QBism] is that no element of a set
{P1, P2, P3} has a truth value before the action of the agent. Rather the truth
value — if you want to call it that (maybe it is not the best terminology) — is
generated (or given birth to) in the process. At that point, one of the Pi stands
in autonomous existence (within the agent), whereas the other two fall.
I hope I have characterized both of us accurately!
Here is the question that has been troubling me. Is there any real distinction
(one that makes an pragmatic difference) between our views? You say the truth
value is there and revealed by the measurement, and I say it’s made by the
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measurement and wasn’t there beforehand. So what?
If there is a pragmatic distinction, Steven van Enk and I through discussions
this week have come to believe that it may show up most clearly in how you and I
would treat counterfactuals with regard to measurement. Let us take a situation
where an agent ascribes a quantum state ρ to the system; contemplating the
measurement {P1, P2, P3}, we know that he will ascribe probabilities according
to the Born rule tr(ρPi) for the various outcomes. Suppose he now performs
that measurement and actually gets value P2.
What does getting that outcome teach him about the quantum system? I
think you would say it reveals which of the three mutually exclusive properties
the system actually had. On the other hand, I would say it teaches him nothing
about the system per se; the outcome P2 is just the consequence of his action.
What is the implication of this on counterfactuals? Here’s at least one.
Suppose after you get your outcome, you contemplate magically having per-
formed a distinct measurement {Q1, Q2, Q3} instead. I think you’re careful to
point out in your paper that the knowledge of P2 carries no implication for what
you would have found with this other imaginary measurement. But what hap-
pens if you conceptually transform this measurement {Q1, Q2, Q3} to one closer
and closer to the original, i.e., to {P1, P2, P3}? In the limit when the two are
identical again, I think you would say that knowledge of the outcome P2 in the
original case implies that P2 will also be the outcome in the limiting counterfac-
tual case. But what would I say? From my conception, there is no reason at all
to believe that the limiting counterfactual case will give rise to the same out-
come P2. The best one can do, either in the original case or the counterfactual
case, is to say that an outcome i will arise with probability tr(ρPi). In fact, a
counterfactual analysis with this kind of result may be the very meaning of the
idea that quantum measurements are generative of their outcomes.
CAF to Jeffrey Bub, 24 June 2006:
Bubism 1. The transition from classical to quantum mechanics involves re-
placing the representation of properties as a Boolean lattice, i.e., as the subsets
of a set, with the representation of properties as a certain sort of non-Boolean
lattice.
The? I would rather say one possible way of looking at the transition from
classical to quantum mechanics involves blah, blah, blah. And, you partially
recover from this a few paragraphs later where you write:
Bubism 2. Of course, other ways of associating propositions with features
of a Hilbert space are possible, and other ways of assigning truth values, includ-
ing multi-valued truth value assignments and contextual truth value assignments.
Ultimately, the issue here concerns what we take as the salient structural change
involved in the transition from classical to quantum mechanics, and this depends
on identifying quantum propositions that take the same probabilities for all quan-
tum states.
But let me hang on this point for a moment despite your partial recovery. For
when you say things like, “Fuchs misses the essential point,” you should realize
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that that judgement (at most) comes from within a context very different from
the one I am working in.
I would, for instance, never say “the representation of properties in quantum
mechanics involves as a certain sort of non-Boolean lattice.” That is just not the
context I’m working in. Similarly, I would not say, as you say in the next section,
“Somehow, a measurement process enables an indeterminate property, that is
neither instantiated nor not instantiated by a system in a given quantum state,
to either instantiate itself or not with a certain probability.” — i.e., I would not
say that a measurement process instantiates any property at all for a quantum
system.
Instead, the setting for our quantum Bayesian program (i.e., the particular
one of Caves, Schack, and me), is one where all the properties intrinsic to a
quantum system are timeless and have no dynamical character whatsoever —
moreover, those properties have nothing to do with particular quantum state
assignments or particular quantum measurement outcomes. In that way, the
idea of a non-Boolean lattice simply doesn’t apply to them.
John Sipe recently made a nice write-up of our view for his book that, I
think, brings this one difference between you and me into pretty stark relief.
Maybe it’s worthwhile to quote it at length, as it may lay the groundwork for a
good bit of our later discussion:
This interpretation shares some features with operationalism.
Measurements, for example, are understood in a manner close to that
adopted by an operationalist. They are characterized by POVMs, and
those abstract elements are associated with tasks in the laboratory
undertaken with gadgets that are part of the primitives of the theory.
The result of any such measurement is simply one of a possible number
of outcomes, and there is no talk of these measurements “revealing”
the value of any variable, in the sense that an arbitrarily precise posi-
tion measurement in classical mechanics is often described as revealing
the position of a particle. Yet, compared to the operationalist’s quiet,
unassuming terminology of “tasks” and “outcomes,” advocates of this
interpretation adopt a more active manner of speaking, referring to
“actions” (or even “interventions”) undertaken by an agent, and the
“consequences” that those actions elicit.
This indicates a role for the observer (or agent) in this interpre-
tation that is more significant than the role played by such a person
in operational quantum mechanics. The significance of that role be-
comes clear when we consider the reference of density operators in
this interpretation. Density operators do not refer to sets of tasks
that define preparations, as they do in operational quantum mechan-
ics. Rather, a density operator is taken to encode the beliefs of an
agent concerning the probabilities of different consequences of possi-
ble future actions. While these beliefs may be informed by knowledge
of the tasks involved in setting up the particular gadgetry associated
with a preparation, they are not determined by it. Hence there is not
a unique, “correct” density operator necessarily associated with each
preparation procedure, as there is in operational quantum mechanics.
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In the present view two different researchers, one more skilled in quan-
tum mechanics than the other, could adopt different density operators
after being identically informed of the details of a particular prepara-
tion procedure. One density operator might be more successful than
the other in predicting the possible consequences of future actions, but
each would be the correct density operator for that agent insofar as it
correctly encoded that agent’s beliefs.
Thus, while the abstract elements in the theory associated with
measurements are identified with tasks in the laboratory, as in opera-
tionalism, the abstract elements in the theory associated with prepa-
rations are identified with beliefs of the agent, signaling a kind of
empiricist perspective.
So in contrast to operational quantum mechanics, where density
operators are necessarily updated following a measurement — since
the combination of the previous preparation and the measurement
constitutes a new preparation, and an operationalist associates the
new density operator with that — in this view there is no necessary
updating of a density operator in the light of measurement outcomes,
since there is no necessary connection between the consequences of an
agent’s action (more prosaically, “measurement outcomes”) and his or
her beliefs. After all, foolish researchers, like foolish men and women
more generally, could choose not to modify their beliefs concerning the
consequences of future actions despite their knowledge of the conse-
quences of recent ones. And note that even wise researchers will not
update their beliefs concerning future actions until they know the con-
sequences of recent ones; hence a wise researcher’s “personal density
operator” (the only kind of density operator there is in this view!) will
not change until that researcher is actually aware of a measurement
outcome.
Other abstract elements in the theory, such as the dimension of the
Hilbert space, and the dimensions of various factor spaces, are actually
associated with instances of attributes of physical objects. Hence with
respect to the reference of these abstract elements this interpretation
is realist. The manner in which this works can best be seen by first
reviewing the role measurement outcomes play in revealing aspects of
the universe in realist classical mechanics, and then comparing that
with the role such outcomes play in this interpretation of quantum
mechanics.
An arbitrarily precise position measurement of a bead moving
along a wire, in realist classical mechanics, reveals the position of
the particle, the instance (say, x = 10 cm) of a particular attribute
(bead position) of a physical object (bead) that actually exists in Na-
ture. In contrast, a usual Stern–Gerlach device oriented along the z
direction does not, in this interpretation of quantum mechanics, reveal
the z-component of angular momentum, or for that matter anything
else. The particular outcome of one experimental run is simply a
consequence of performing the experiment. Nonetheless, repeated ex-
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perimentation does reveal that the electron associated with the atom
passing through the device should be taken as a spin-1/2 particle.
Here the attribute under consideration is taken to be internal angular
momentum, and the instance – the irreducible representation appro-
priate to the particle of interest – spin-1/2. The role of an “instance of
an attribute” in this interpretation is not to specify one of a number of
possible expressions of existence, as it is in realist classical mechanics,
but rather to specify one class of possible beliefs – the one that the
theory recommends – about the consequences of future interventions
of a particular type.
Note that, at least within nonrelativistic physics, the instances of
the attributes in this interpretation are fixed. A spin-1/2 particle re-
mains a spin-1/2 particle. Thus there are no dynamical variables in
this theory, only nondynamical variables analogous to the mass of a
particle in nonrelativistic classical mechanics. The point of physics is
to identify these nondynamical variables. Repeated interventions by
experimentalists, and the careful noting of the range of consequences
that those interventions elicit, is how these fixed instances are discov-
ered.
In this interpretation of quantum mechanics, with its mix of op-
erationalist, empiricist, and realist identification of abstract elements
in the theory, these fixed instances specify the [[agent independent
features]] of the “quantum world,” and it is the business of physics to
figure them out. This is done by experimentation, and the theoretical
linking of basis vectors in the appropriate Hilbert space with various
measurements, providing an “anchor” for those basis kets to our expe-
rience, the consequences of our actions. Particularly significant is the
Hamiltonian operator and its basis kets [[in Caves’ particular version
of all this]]. As time evolves during what is colloquially described as
“unitary evolution,” we have the option to modify our beliefs or to
modify the anchors of those beliefs; the first strategy corresponds to
the usual Schrödinger picture, the second to the Heisenberg picture.
Regardless of the strategy, the [[properties intrinsic to the]] quan-
tum world of this interpretation [[are]] a fixed, static thing. [[This
aspect of the quantum world]] is a frozen, changeless place. Dynamics
refers not to the quantum world, but only to our actions, our experi-
ences, and our beliefs as agents. Or, more poetically (à la Chris), life
does not arise from our interventions; it is our interventions.
John doesn’t represent us correctly in every detail of this presentation — for
the purpose at hand, it only seemed essential to modify him in a few instances,
which I have have marked with double brackets [[·]] — but I would say he is
roughly on track, and he certainly gets it that we are not concerned with the
usual way of ascribing properties to quantum systems via the values of mea-
surement outcomes or probability-1 predictions (i.e., the eigenvector-eigenvalue
link).
Which brings me back again to your paper:
Bubism 3. For a quantum state, the properties represented by Hilbert space
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subspaces are not partitioned into two such mutually exclusive and collectively
exhaustive sets: some propositions are assigned no truth value. Only propositions
represented by subspaces that contain the state are assigned the value ‘true,’ and
only propositions represented by subspaces orthogonal to the state are assigned the
value ‘false.’ This means that propositions represented by subspaces that are at
some non-zero or non-orthogonal angle to the ray representing the quantum state
are not assigned any truth value in the state, and the corresponding properties
must be regarded as indeterminate or indefinite: according to the theory, there
can be no fact of the matter about whether these properties are instantiated or
not.
You see, my way of looking at things wouldn’t even allow me to say what
you say here. It is just a very different world that I am working in.
To try to make this point, let me quote a couple of emails I wrote to Bas van
Fraassen a few months ago. It started with my saying this:
The way I view quantum measurement now is this. When one per-
forms a “measurement” on a system, all one is really doing is taking
an action on that system. From this view, time evolutions or uni-
tary operations etc., are not actions that one can take on a system;
only “measurements” are. Thus the word measurement is really a mis-
nomer — it is only an action. In contradistinction to the old idea that
a measurement is a query of nature, or a way of gathering informa-
tion or knowledge about nature, from this view it is just an action on
something external — it is a kick of sorts. The “measurement device”
should be thought of as being like a prosthetic hand for the agent — it
is merely an extension of him; in this context, it should not be thought
of as an independent entity beyond the agent. What quantum theory
tells us is that the formal structure of all our possible actions (per-
haps via the help of these prosthetic hands) is captured by the idea
of a Positive-Operator-Valued Measure (or POVM, or so-called “gen-
eralized measurement”). We take our actions upon a system, and in
return, the system gives rise to a reaction — in older terms, that is the
“measurement outcome” — but the reaction is in the agent himself.
The role of the quantum system is thus more like that of the philoso-
pher’s stone; it is the catalyst that brings about a transformation (or
transmutation) of the agent.
Reciprocally, there [[may]] be a transmutation of the system ex-
ternal to the agent. But the great trouble in quantum interpretation
— I now think — is that we have been too inclined to jump the gun
all these years: We have been misidentifying where the transmutation
indicated by quantum mechanics (i.e., the one which quantum the-
ory actually talks about, the “measurement outcome”) takes place. It
[[may]] be the case that there are also transmutations in the exter-
nal world (transmutations in the system) in each quantum “measure-
ment”, BUT that is not what quantum theory is about. [[Quantum
mechanics]] is only a hint of that more interesting transmutation. [[In-
stead, the main part of quantum mechanics is about how]] the agent
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and the system [[together bring about]] a little act of creation that
ultimately has an autonomy of its own.
which led to the following dialogue:
van Fraassenism 1. Writers on the subject have emphasized that
the main form of measurement in quantum mechanics has as result
the value of the observable at the end of the measurement – and that
this observable may not even have had a definite value, let alone the
same one, before.
Your phrase “may not even have a definite value” floated to my
attention. I guess this floated to my attention because I had recently
read the following in one of the Brukner/Zeilinger papers,
Only in the exceptional case of the qubit in an eigenstate of
the measurement apparatus the bit value observed reveals a
property already carried by the qubit. Yet in general the value
obtained by the measurement has an element of irreducible
randomness and therefore cannot be assumed to reveal the bit
value or even a hidden property of the system existing before
the measurement is performed.
I wondered if your “may not” referred to effectively the same thing as
their disclaimer at the beginning of this quote. Maybe it doesn’t. Any-
way, the Brukner/Zeilinger disclaimer is a point that Caves, Schack,
and I now definitely reject: From our view all measurements are gen-
erative of a non-preexisting property regardless of the quantum state.
I.e., measurements never reveal “a property already carried by the
qubit.” For this, of course, we have to adopt a Richard Jeffrey-like
analysis of the notion of “certainty” — i.e., that it too, like any prob-
ability assignment, is a state of mind — or one along (my reading of)
Wittgenstein’s — i.e., that “certainty is a tone of voice” — to make it
all make sense, but so be it.
and
van Fraassenism 2. Suppose that an observer assigns eigenstate
|a〉 of A to a system on the basis of a measurement, then predicts
with certainty that an immediate further measurement of A will yield
value a, and then makes that second measurement and finds a. Don’t
you even want to say that the second measurement just showed to this
observer, as was expected, the value that A already had? He does not
need to change his subjective probabilities at all in response to the 2nd
measurement outcome, does he?
It is not going to be easy, because this in fact is what Schack
and I are actually writing a whole paper about at the moment —
this point has been the most controversial thing (with the Mermin,
Unruh, Wootters, Spekkens, etc., crowd) that we’ve said in a while,
and it seems that it’s going to require a whole paper to do the point
justice. But I’ll still try to give you the skinny of it:
26
• Q: He does not need to change his subjective probabilities at all
in response to the 2nd measurement outcome, does he?
• A: No he doesn’t.
• Q: Don’t you even want to say that the second measurement
just showed to this observer, as was expected, the value that A
already had?
• A: No I don’t.
The problem is one of the very consistency of the subjective point
of view of quantum states. The task we set before ourselves is to
completely sever any supposed connections between quantum states
and the actual, existent physical properties of the quantum system. It
is only from this — if it can be done, and of course we try to argue
it can be done — that we get any “interpretive traction” (as Chris
Timpson likes to say) for the various problems that plague QM. [[. . . ]]
This may boil down to a difference between the Rovellian and the
Bayesian/Paulian approach; I’m not clear on that yet. [[. . . ]] Rovelli
relativizes the states to the observer, even the pure states, and with
that — through the eigenstate-eigenvalue link — the values of the
observables. I’m not completely sure what that means in Rovelli-world
yet, however.
I, on the other hand, do know that I would say that a measurement
intervention is always generative of a new fact in the world, whatever
the measurer’s quantum state for the system. If the measurer’s state
for the system happens to be an eigenstate of the Hermitian operator
describing the measurement intervention, then the measurer will be
confident, certain even, of the consequence of the measurement inter-
vention he is about to perform. But that certainty is in the sense
of Jeffrey and Wittgenstein above — it is a “tone of voice” of ut-
ter confidence. The world could still, as a point of principle, smite
the measurer down by giving him a consequence that he predicted to
be impossible. In a traditional development — with ties to a corre-
spondence theory of truth — we would then say, “Well, that proves
the measurer was wrong with his quantum state assignment. He was
wrong before he ever went through the motions of the measurement.”
But as you’ve gathered, I’m not about traditional developments. In-
stead I would say, “Even from my view there is a sense in which the
measurer’s quantum state is wrong. But it is made wrong by the ac-
tual consequence of the intervention — it is made wrong on the fly;
its wrongness was not determined beforehand.” And that seems to be
the main point of contention.
Particularly this is going to be a key point when I finally come to the analysis
in Section 7 of your paper.
CAF to Veiko Palge and Bill Demopoulos, 14 November 2006:
The best answer I can give you, I think, is that neither of these kinds of structures
[sigma-algebras or noncommutative generalizations] map onto what I’m thinking.
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The main reason for this is that I think it is incorrect to think of the process
of “quantum measurement” either 1) as the revelation of a property inherent
in the system under observation, or 2) as the production of such a property in
the system. And without that, I don’t think there is enough glue to bind the
events occurring in quantum measurements together into an algebraic structure
(say, a lattice or a Boolean algebra, or even a partial Boolean algebra, where
there are Boolean algebras tied together at the edges) — at least not in any
useful sense that intrigues me as a physicist. [. . .] I think there is a fruitful
similarity between what [Bill] and I are seeking, even if we ultimately diverge.
It is this: In both our views — and they are the only places I’ve ever seen this
style of idea — even when two measurements share a common element (say
a given projector Pi), there is no implication of a common truth value being
imposed on Pi across the measurements. The reason for this for Bill is that the
system’s properties are bound up with the whole orthogonal family of projectors
the individual Pi happens to be embedded within. In contrast, the reason for
this for me is that I don’t think of quantum measurement outcomes as signifying
properties intrinsic to the system — they are simply consequences of actions for
me. What makes the element Pi identified across measurements — for both of
us — is not truth value, but that the probabilities for Pi are identical in both
cases. What this means particularly from my Bayesian way of thinking is that a
judgment is being made: I, the agent, am identifying this potential outcome of
this measurement with that potential outcome of that measurement because I
judge their probabilities equal under all imaginable circumstances. (See Section
4.1 of my quant-ph/0205039.) It is not that they are identified in Nature itself.
Thus, for me, I think, there is no good sense in which they lie in the same event
space at all.
CAF to Veiko Palge, 10 January 2007:
Let me start with your first sentence: “It seems that one of the main reasons you
reject a well-structured event space is that it assumes a realistic interpretation:
its elements would correspond to intrinsic properties of quantum systems.” That
is the wrong direction of reasoning — though I am probably the cause of this
misimpression through the restrictive choices of readings I recommended to you.
It is not that I reject a well-structured event space because it assumes its elements
would correspond to intrinsic properties of quantum systems, but rather this is
the result of a thoroughgoing subjective interpretation of probabilities within
the quantum context. What cannot be forgotten is that quantum-measurement
outcomes, by the usual rules, determine posterior quantum states. And those
posterior quantum states in turn determine further probabilities.
Thus, if one takes the timid, partial move that Itamar and Jeff Bub, say,
advocate — i.e., simply substituting one or another nonBoolean algebra for the
space of events, and leaving the rest of Bayesian probability theory seemingly
intact — then one ultimately ends up re-objectifying what had been initially
supposed to be subjective probabilities. That is: When I look at the click, and
note that it is value i, and value i is rigidly — or I should say, factually —
associated with the projector Πi in some nonBoolean algebra, then I have no
choice (through Lüders rule) but to assign the posterior quantum state Πi to
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the system. This means the new quantum state Πi will be as factual as the
click. And any new probabilities (for the outcomes of further measurements)
determined from this new quantum state Πi will also be factual.
So, the starting point of the reasoning is to assume that there is a category
distinction between probabilities and facts (this is the subjectivist move of de
Finetti and Ramsey). Adding the ingredient of the usual rules of quantum me-
chanics, one derives a dilemma: If there is a rigid, factual connection between
the clicks i and elements Πi of an algebraic structure, then probabilities are fac-
tual after all. Holding tight to my assumption of a category distinction between
facts and probabilities, I end up rejecting the idea that there is a unique, factual
mapping between i and Πi. [. . .]
[Now let] me return to your paragraph before signing off. If I read this
question of yours in isolation: “Can’t one just take the elements as corresponding
to clicks and blips in the measurement apparatus?” Then at one level my answer
is, “Of course; I’ve never said otherwise.” What is at issue here is whether the
events — the clicks and blips themselves — fall within the kind of algebraic
structure you speak of, or whether it is something else (something a conceptual
layer above the events) that falls within it. From the [proto-QBist] point of view,
for a single device with clicks i, one agent might associate the clicks with a set of
orthogonal projectors Πi, and another agent might associate them with a set of
noncommuting effects (i.e., POVM elements) Ei. This was the sense in which I
meant there is no stand-alone event space at all: For us, the algebraic structure
of the events (the clicks and blips), their level of commutivity or noncommutivity
and whatnot, is just as subjective as the quantum state. The clicks i themselves
are objective (in the sense of not being functions of the subject’s beliefs or
degrees of belief), but their association with a particular set of operators Ei is a
subjective judgment.
I hope this completely answers your question now.
But let me extend the discussion a little to try to give you a more positive
vision of what we’re up to. The starting point is the category distinction between
facts and probabilities applied to the quantum measurement context. From this
we glean that quantum operations and quantum states are of the same level of
subjectivity. But that is not our ending point. Because, implicit in everything we
have said there are these autonomous, realistically-interpreted quantum systems:
The agent has to interact with the quantum system to receive his quantum
measurement outcome. No quantum system, no measurement outcome. Thus
the [proto-QBist] position is more than a kind of positivism or operationalism.
The objects of the external world with which we interact have a certain kind
of active power, and we become aware of the presence of that active power
particularly in the course of quantum measurement. When we kick on a quantum
system it surprises us with a kick back.
Can we say anything more explicit about the active power? Can we give it
some mathematical shape? Yes, I think we can, but that is a research project.
Still, I think the hints for it are already in place . . . and indeed they are in
the quantum formalism, as we would expect them to be. One of the hints is
this: The Born transformation rule. When we make probability assignments
in quantum mechanics, we are assuming more than de Finettian / Ramseyian
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coherence. We assume that if we set the probabilities for the outcomes of this
measurement this way, then we should set the probabilities for the outcomes of
that measurement that way and the rule of transformation is a linear one. This,
from the [proto-QBist] view, is the content of the Born rule (see the last section
in the attached paper). And it is empirical, contingent: A different world than
the one we live in might have had a different transformation rule. So, if we’re
looking for something beyond personal probabilities in quantum mechanics, that
is a point to take seriously. It hints of some deep property of our world, and I’d
like to know what that property is. [. . .]
Though [the proto-QBists] banish the algebraic structure of Hilbert space
from having anything to do with a fundamental event space (and in this way
their quantum Bayesianism differs from the cluster of ideas Pitowsky and Bub
are playing with), they do not banish the algebraic structure from playing any
role whatsoever in quantum mechanics. It is just that the algebraic structure
rears its head at the conceptual level of coherence rather than in a fundamental
event space. It is not that potential events are objectively tied to together in
an algebraic way, but that our gambling commitments (normatively) should be.
This is another point of contact between my view and Bill’s.
CAF to Bill Demopoulos, 7 January 2011:
Take a POVM consisting of operators Ek. I.e., these are positive semi-definite op-
erators that sum to the identity operator. Thus they might seem like mysterious
abstract entities (perhaps properties of the system, or properties of the ‘measur-
ing device’, or maybe something still weirder, though surely agent-independent).
But, via a fiducial SIC POVM in the sky (as I talk about in my papers), one can
map these operators to a set of conditional probabilities p(i|k) in a one-to-one
fashion. That is, these operators contain nothing over and above the prescrip-
tion of a probability assignment. There is nothing to them mathematically but
that — nothing is lost by thinking of them in these terms, as probability assign-
ments. Similarly, the philosophical point should be this: That there is nothing
conceptually more than this either.
So, what should one call the “outcome” of a quantum measurement? Well,
for the agent it is an experience “k” . . . but what meaning does that have for
him? How could he articulate it? What does it mean to him? How will he change
his behavior with regard to it? The answer is: It is p(i|k). It is a probability
distribution conditioned on k. The only operational handle the agent has on k
is through the assignment he makes, p(i|k).
But all probabilities (for the personalist Bayesian) are subjectively given (i.e.,
functions of the agent only, his history and experiences, not the object). And
thus, I guess, my resistance to part of your way of thinking about effects. (Of
course, as you should know by now, I am in serious agreement with you in other
ways . . . in fact, probably with you more than with any other living philosopher.)
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